Qi Tongwei: Sign-in relationship started during student days

Chapter 864 Five major crimes (2)

Article 2. Privatization of power: Using the name of "rotation system" to form cliques for personal gain.

Qi Tongwei's move to implement the "rotation system" in Beishan seems to be an "innovation" in cadre and personnel reform, but in fact it hides a sinister intention of power liquidation.

He transformed cadre rotation into a "political reshuffle" to eliminate dissidents and cultivate cronies: by frequently transferring cadres in key positions, he transferred backbones who were not affiliated with the "Handa Gang" away from core departments.

They placed loyal supporters in key areas like finance, public security, and infrastructure. This power play of "you in, I out" turned the rotation system, originally designed to cultivate cadres, into a tool for power monopoly, leading to demoralization and factional rivalry within departments.

Even more alarming is the vicious cycle of this "team culture"—cadres are forced to cling to the core of power to protect themselves, further exacerbating the rigidity of the political environment. When the rotation system devolves into a "power-sharing scheme," organizational principles are completely eroded, leaving only a complex web of interests.

It can be said that this is simply making a joke of the careers of the vast majority of cadres.

Everyone knows that there are clear regulations that there is an age limit for cadres.

In two or three years, many people who had not originally exceeded the line will also exceed it, and will no longer be considered for promotion.

But for the sake of their political future, many people had no choice but to get close to the two top leaders and join the Handa Gang.

Article 3: Being domineering as a person and as an official.

Half a year after taking office, he had conflicts with many sister cities and made a big name for himself in Hanjiang.

In this storm of friction, he is best known for two things.

One of them was openly interfering in Tianzhou affairs. Because of an ordinary car accident, he sent people from Beishan to arrest the relatives of a city leader of Tianzhou City for several months.

The second was to use the overdue coal payments to coerce the Wenshan Municipal Government, and under the guise of "opening up the economic arteries of the provincial capital", forcibly push forward the "National Highway Reconstruction Project" in Wenshan that exceeded the budget by three times.

From October to December 98, the wind was biting cold, and thousands of people worked day and night on the Wenshan section of the National Highway from Beishan to the provincial capital, just to make this comrade repay the wages that should have belonged to the vast number of workers in Wenshan.

His various actions have exposed his overbearing style of alienating administrative power into "unfair clauses".

Article 4: Violation of regulations on officials engaging in business.

His wife is the president of a well-known company in Hong Kong and holds shares in the company.

Recently, the wife openly built a factory in the area under Qi Tongwei's jurisdiction, suspected of using the spouse's power to form "shadow power" and openly violating the provisions of the "Regulations" prohibiting relatives of leading cadres from engaging in business.

His behavior crossed the red line of integrity discipline and aroused public doubts about the integrity of power and the fairness of the market economy.

Fifth, he has a serious personal political hero complex and likes to advance reforms.

In order to establish the banner of anti-corruption and promote one's own image of integrity and honesty.

The means of dealing with corruption in the subordinate city of HK are not mature enough.

It resulted in the death of a deputy mayor and widespread corruption.

A large number of investors fled the country, causing a severe economic downturn and bringing incalculable losses to the local area.

At the same time, the trend of carrying out advanced reforms in Beishan is actually violating regulations and crossing the red line.

For example, using so-called monetary and material incentives to attract investment from all over the country.

Is this so-called nationwide investment promotion a new form of political corruption?

A cadre earns tens of thousands of yuan a month.

In the year-end summary, the municipal finance department gave tens of millions in incentives to investment promotion personnel. Where did all this money come from? Was it corruption or reform?